El blog de Albert Esplugas

Anarquismo en el sudeste asiático

Tom Palmer, rothbardiano renegado, escribe una interesante reseña de The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia, del antropólogo James C. Scott. El libro expone una narrativa alternativa sobre la historia de Zomia, una extensa área del sudeste asiático que tradicionalmente ha escapado al control estatal y ha dado cobijo a diversas culturas étnicas refugiadas de la "civilización". Según Scott, las tribus de Zomia han preferido una vida más primitiva y anárquica al precio de la modernidad estatal: impuestos, guerra y esclavitud.

Understanding the nature of such zones where political control “runs out of breath” is not merely of interest to historians and social scientists. It’s central to understanding many things about the modern world, including the difficulties that NATO and its allied forces face in Afghanistan, the problems with other nation-building campaigns around the globe, the nature and costs of resistance to predatory state power, and the evolutionary relationship between tax systems and economic structures—that is, between systems of theft and structures of production. In effect, Scott gives us a libertarian geography.

Scott draws on the insights of Pierre Clastres, whose 1974 book Society Against the State undermined the narrative of the progressive transition from archaic society to state-governed civilizations by showing how a variety of Native American tribes developed systems to keep the state at bay. Such groups did not merely “fail to develop a state”; they succeeded in keeping one from developing.

Eduardo Robredo también se hacía eco de esta obra en su blog.

Camarada Duch confiesa crímenes contra la humanidad

Kaing Guek Eav, también conocido como camarada Duch, fue el jefe del principal centro de torturas de Camboya durante el régimen comunista de los Jemeres Rojos, que se llevó por delante nada más y nada menos que a una cuarta parte de la población del país (1.7 millones de personas).

El camara Duch, a quien se le imputa la muerte de 17.000 camboyanos, ha admitido hoy su culpabilidad y ha pedido perdón a los familiares de las víctimas (solo 15 personas salieron vivas de aquella prisión).

El juicio contra Duch es el primero que se lleva a cabo después de tres décadas desde la caída de Pol Pot, durante las cuales los líderes de aquél régimen gozaron de impunidad. Duch tiene ahora 66 años. Cuatro líderes más de la cúpula comunista están a la espera de ser juzgados, entre ellos la cuñada de Pol Pot.

Kaing Guek Eav – known as Comrade Duch – was the director of Tuol Sleng or S-21, the regime's most notorious prison, where thousands of men, women and children were tortured and killed between 1977 and 1979. (...)

His apology, while expected, was nonetheless electrifying as, standing behind a bullet-proof screen, he faced a courtroom filled with hundreds of relatives of his victims, and told them: "I would like to emphasise that I am responsible for the crimes committed at S-21, especially the torture and execution of the people there. May I be permitted to apologise to the survivors of the regime and also the families of the victims whose loved ones died brutally at S-21." (...)

A 45-page indictment read to the court described Tuol Sleng as a place where victims were sent only to be executed. Prisoners were tortured into confessing imaginary crimes against the State then were blugeoned to death, had their throats and stomachs slit open, or were literally bled to death.

Witnesses told prosecution lawyers that child prisoners were dropped from the prison's upper floors to break their necks, while a group of foreign prisoners was burnt alive.

Islamismo moderado en Malasia

Bryan Caplan comenta su experiencia en Kuala Lumpur y Malacca. Un 60% de la población en Malasia es musulmana.

1. At least in KL, there was a nearly uniform distribution of styles of dress - everything from Asian Britney Spears to burkhas without eye slits.  No one seemed to notice or care.

2. Muslim teens in conservative dress freely held hands and engaged in other PDAs.  The head scarf is a much weaker signal of behavior than it is at GMU.

3. The big KL bookstore I wandered carried not only Discover Your Inner Economist and Radicals for Capitalism, but also Richard Dawkins' The God Delusion.

4. Most of the public propaganda focuses on Malaysian nationalism, not Islam.  It's offensive in its own way; how can you talk about the wonders of "Malaysian unity" without mentioning bloody anti-Chinese pogroms of the 60s?  But I saw no evidence of an official effort to treat non-Muslims as dhimmis.

5. I saw no public signs of anti-semitism - even in the display on the Palestinian conflict in the Islamic Arts Museum.

6. There were two big Muslim controversies going on during my visit.  A council of mullahs had ruled that yoga and "tomboyism" were contrary to Islam.   But at least one major newspaper, the New Straits Times, reported on these fatwas with thinly-veiled contempt.

(...)

Overall, I'd say that the journalists' bias against fundamentalist Islam was stronger than the liberal bias of the New York Times.

I only spent three days in Malaysia.  I suspect that rural areas would be less moderate than major cities like KL and Malacca.  Nevertheless, I think that most Westerners would be shocked by the pluralism and tolerance that I saw.

En la discusión hay varios comentarios informados que confirman, amplian o matizan las impresiones de Caplan.

Singapur, una democracia de partido único

Singapur no es en realidad una dictadura, dice Bryan Caplan a su vuelta de la ciudad-Estado. Es fundamentalmente una democracia, aunque de facto solo un partido domine el Parlamento. Copio su entrada casi entera:

Georgianos descontentos y pruebas contra Rusia

Las críticas contra Saakashvili están arreciando ahora que se han levantado las restricciones a la libertad de expresión en Georgia (vigentes durante la contienda). El Washington Post informa que varias voces reclaman investigaciones sobre los errores diplomáticos y tácticos cometidos por el Gobierno, y algunos analistas predicen que Saakashvili será presionado para que renuncie.

David Usupashvili, leader of the opposition Republican Party, said he had serious concerns about the decision to fight the much larger Russian army. "I don't believe that the Georgian government started this military action, but I condemn my government's action to respond with a full-scale military conflict" (...)

David Gamkrelidze, leader of the opposition New Rights party, said that "[b]y his military rhetoric, and all kinds of provocations, Saakashvili tried to show that he can return these territories by the military way, that he has this capacity, he has this force." (...)

Officials present at some of the prewar discussions said that Saakashvili and a tight group of supporters seemed convinced they had the military power to win back South Ossetia -- which Georgian forces attacked on the night of Aug. 7 -- within a few hours or days and were not interested in opposing points of view.

La política exterior de USA y la chica con minifalda

Doug Bandow, en su artículo "Georgian Fantasies: Where are the Americans?", ahonda en la tesis de que la política exterior norteamericana ha contribuido al estallido de la crisis del Cáucaso, que mencioné en esta entrada.

U.S. behavior provided an almost perfect example of a mixed message. The Bush administration counseled caution, yes, but also meddled in Georgian affairs to promote Saakashvili's rise to power through the Rose Revolution, helped arm and train his military, provided abundant economic and military aid, championed his nation's candidacy for NATO, lavished praise on him for being a wonderful democrat and friend of America, and sent President Bush to Tbilisi. Says Charles Kupchan of the Council on Foreign Relations, "Through private channels [the U.S.] was saying: ‘You have to behave' but publicly it was portraying him as a knight in shining armor, a beacon of freedom." The result, notes Jon Sawyer of the Pulitzer Center for Crisis Reporting, was "that Mikheil Saakashvili approached this thinking that he could be an extension of the West, a partner of the United States." In July Secretary Rice visited Tbilisi and declared, with Saakashvili next to her: "Mr. President, we always fight for our friends." During the war Vice President Richard Cheney told Saakashvili that "Russian aggression must not go unanswered."

None of these actions or statements formally committed the U.S. to go to war, but they could easily have been interpreted that way by an authoritarian populist used to getting his own way and a man desperate to fulfill his campaign promise to reconquer lost territory. Certainly he wanted to believe Washington's expansive professions of comradeship. Observes Kupchan, U.S. policy made Saakashvili "overreach, it made him feel at the end of the day that the West would come to his assistance if he got into trouble."

Human Rights Watch denuncia crímenes en Osetia del Sur

La ONG Human Rights Watch denuncia la quema y saqueo de pueblos étnicamente georgianos en Osetia del Sur por parte de milicias separatistas.

Recent satellite images released by the UN program UNOSAT confirm the widespread torching of ethnic Georgian villages inside South Ossetia, Human Rights Watch said today. Detailed analysis of the damage depicted in five ethnic Georgian villages shows the destruction of these villages around the South Ossetian capital, Tskhinvali, was caused by intentional burning and not armed combat.

“Human Rights Watch researchers personally witnessed Ossetian militias looting and burning down ethnic Georgian villages during their research in the area,” said Rachel Denber, deputy director of the Europe and Central Asia division of Human Rights Watch.

¿Quién disparó primero en el Cáucaso? (Actualizado)

El contrapunto a la tesis de que Georgia inició el enfrentamiento invadiendo Osetia del Sur lo pone Michael Totten con su reportaje sobre el terreno "The Truth About Russia in Georgia" (vía Barcepundit). Según el relato de Totten, los separatistas osetios violaron el alto el fuego atacando pueblos étnicamente georgianos y una columna rusa estaba penetraron en Osetia del Sur antes de que el ejército georgiano empezara a movilizarse.

On the 6th, (...) The shelling intensifies during the night and there is, again, tit for tat, but this time with weapons coming from the South Ossetian side which are not allowed under the agreement. By that time, the Georgians were seriously worried. All their armor that was near Abkhazia starts moving, but they are tanks, they don't have tank transporters, so they move slowly. They don't make it back in time. On the 7th, this continues. That afternoon, the president announces a unilateral ceasefire, a different one from the previous ones. It means I stop firing first, and if you fire, I still won't fire back. That holds until the next part of the story.

USA ha contribuido a que estalle la crisis del Cáucaso

La política exterior de Estados Unidos ha jugado un papel importante en el estallido del conflicto entre Georgia y Rusia. Sin la ayuda militar y el apoyo político que el gobierno americano ha dispensado a Georgia, el gobierno de Saakashvili probablemente no se hubiera creído en posición de lanzar una ofensiva sobre Osetia y exponerse a una predecible intervención rusa.

What is missing from much of the Western morality tale of Georgia vs Russia is any serious assessment of Washington’s role in militarising former Soviet republics and giving a green light to their anti-Russian posturing. From the Ukraine to Uzbekistan to Georgia, Washington has backed a string of dodgy ruling parties and dictatorial leaders as they have upped the ante with their former rulers in the Kremlin. The end result has been more authoritarianism in the East and unpredictability in world affairs. (...)

Just as Western backing has encouraged Georgian officials to crush ‘coup-minded’ oppositionists, so it has bolstered their standoff with the Russians, too. Armed and goaded by Washington, Georgia took the brash, irrational step of launching a real-world military venture to take back South Ossetia from its Russian ‘peacekeepers’.

No se trata de culpar a Estados Unidos del conflicto y eximir de responsabilidad a Rusia y a Georgia. Georgia es responsable de la destrucción provocada en Osetia y Rusia es responsable de la destrucción provacada en Georgia. Pero la política exterior americana ha contribuido a que este enfrentamiento se produzca, y si estamos de acuerdo en que hubiera sido mejor que no se hubiera producido entonces cabe preguntarse si era la política exterior adecuada. Saakashvili quizás ha sido un ingenuo o un imprudente estratega al pensar que Estados Unidos saldría en su defensa o que esa posibilidad disuadiría a los rusos. Pero es razonable pensar que no se hubiera atrevido a tentar a los rusos si Estados Unidos nunca se hubiera implicado en la región y hubiera dejado meridianamente claro a todas las partes que no intervendría en caso de conflicto.

Nota: en unas horas vuelo a Barcelona para estar con mi familia y disfrutar un poco del sol (en Londres no se deja ver mucho). Vuelvo el domingo 31 con las pilas recargadas. Hasta de aquí una semana.

El Estado detrás de las medallas

Vía Cine y Política llego a este interesante artículo de Gary Becker sobre la competición por obtener medallas en las Olimpiadas y los mecanismos de financiación e incentivos que hay detrás de ella.

Es lógico que, a igualdad de circunstancias, un país con una rénta per cápita más alta tenga mejores atletas:

It is further entirely reasonable that countries with higher per capita incomes, other things the same, do better in Olympic and other international competitions. Parents of promising athletes have more resources to hire coaches, buy equipment, and get other help in their quest to improve the performances of their children. High schools and colleges have more resources to spend on their athletic programs. Private groups establish Olympic and other committees with generous resources to help in the training of the most promising athletes. Companies sponsor athletic programs and offer other incentives- such as the $1 million that Speedo promised Michael Phelps if he succeeded in winning 8 gold medals at the Beijing Olympics. (...)

La razón por la que China y otros países autoritarios son tan exitosos en las Olimpiadas está en parte ligada a su condición de dictaduras: tienen más autonomía para redistribuir recursos a la promoción de atletas y para coaccionar a los padres o a los propios atletas.

The importance of communist and other single party countries on the surface is more surprising. It is not that these countries send more athletes to the Olympics than other countries with similar populations, etc- they do not- but authoritarian countries do better per athlete that they send. The reason appears to be that governments of these countries spend considerable resources and energies in finding young promising athletes, and in providing systematic training and equipment in centralized facilities. According to the NY Times' editorial of August 17th, China has spent billions of dollars on its state sports program since the 2000 Sydney Games. These countries also can sometimes use their authoritarian structure to force parents to let their children be taken to centralized facilities, and have refused to allow athletes who win medals to retire. Such activities clearly help explain China’s rapid rise to athletic prominence, but the same considerations were behind East Germany's success in earlier Olympics, and in the great success of the Soviet Union prior to its breakup.

¿Somos todos georgianos u osetios?

Un equilibrado artículo de Michael Dobbs en el Washington Post sobre la crisis en el Cáucaso: 'We Are All Georgians'? Not So Fast.

[T]he events of the past week in Georgia have little in common with either Hitler's dismemberment of Czechoslovakia on the eve of World War II or Soviet policies in Eastern Europe. They are better understood against the backdrop of the complica ted ethnic politics of the Caucasus, a part of the world where historical grudges run deep and oppressed can become oppressors in the bat of an eye. (...)

It soon became clear to me that the Ossetians viewed Georgians in much the same way that Georgians view Russians: as aggressive bullies bent on taking away their independence. "We are much more worried by Georgian imperialism than Russian imperialism," an Ossetian leader, Gerasim Khugaev, told me then. "It is closer to us, and we feel its pressure all the time."

Como ya han venido apuntando otros comentaristas, las credenciales demócratas de Saakashvili dejan bastante que desear.

Saakashvili's image in the West, and particularly in the United States, is that of the great "democrat," the leader of the "Rose Revolution" who spearheaded a popular uprising against former American favorite Eduard Shevardnadze in November 2003. It is true that he has won two reasonably free elections, but he has also displayed some autocratic tendencies: He sent riot police to crush an opposition protest in Tbilisi last November and shuttered an opposition television station.

Las "razones humanitarias" que alega Putin para intervenir en Georgia no tienen demasiada credibilidad a la luz de su campaña en Chechenia.

Putin and Medvedev have defended their incursion into Georgia as motivated by a desire to stop the "genocide" of Ossetians by Georgians. It is difficult to take their moral outrage very seriously. There is a striking contrast between Russian support for the right of Ossetian self-determination in Georgia and the brutal suppression of Chechens who were trying to exercise that very same right within the boundaries of Russia.

Vale la pena leer el artículo entero. La política exterior neocón de Estados Unidos tampoco se salva de la crítica.

Por cierto, me sorprenden algunos comentarios en el blog de Fonseca sobre el status oficial de Osetia del Sur. Se arguye que Osetia no es un país independiente reconocido, y al parecer eso otorga a Georgia legitimidad para bombardear la región e intervenir en ella a placer. Al fin y al cabo se trata de un gobierno resolviendo problemas internos. Pero no creo que estos mismos comentaristas fueran igual de comprensivos con Serbia cuando resolvía sus problemas internos en Kosovo, o con Rusia cuando pulverizaba Chechenia, o con Iraq cuando masacraba a los kurdos. Lo que quiero decir con esta serie de analogías es que si la región afectada es oficialmente independiente o no es lo de menos desde un punto de vista liberal. Lo que importa es el comportamiento del Estado (de cualquier Estado) en esa región.

Del liberalismo al utilitarismo pasando por Hiroshima

A propósito del 63 aniversario del lanzamiento de la bomba atómica he publicado un artículo en la página del Instituto Juan de Mariana sobre la injusta decisión de Truman y cómo muchos liberales se vuelven utilitaristas y abandonan sus principios cuando se trata de una guerra.

Es verdad que hubiera sido sumamente injusto dejar a Hitler o a Hirohito impunes, ¿pero justifica su impunidad la masacre de decenas de miles de personas? En cualquier otro contexto el trade-off lo hacemos a favor de las víctimas: preferimos dejar impune a un criminal que encerrar a 10 inocentes, y en este sentido somos partidarios de una fuerte presunción de inocencia. Sea como fuere, la realidad posterior a la rendición hace estéril esta discusión: Estados Unidos acabó respetado al emperador. (...)

Muchos liberales que apoyan la decisión de Truman responden a los intervencionistas que la redistribución es injusta porque implica agredir a unos para beneficiar a otros, con independencia de que los beneficiados puedan ser más o que vaya a haber ganancias en "utilidad". Pero tan pronto como hablamos de guerras, o del lanzamiento de las bombas, estos liberales empiezan a usar los mismos argumentos que utilizaban los intervencionistas y que ellos desechaban.

Rusofobia, provocaciones y doble rasero

Otra ración de opiniones que se apartan de la línea mainstream pro-georgiana en la crisis del Cáucaso.

Justin Raimondo sobre las raíces del sesgo anti-ruso en Russophobia: A Political Pathology:

Putin immediately moved against the oligarchs, and this was his first great sin in Western eyes, the beginning of the long campaign to defame him as Stalin reborn.

This, of course, is what those who want to keep Russia weak and properly compliant would say about any strong leader in the Kremlin. Yeltsin, surrounded by a host of American advisers and in a state of constant inebriation, was a pushover. Putin is anything but, and therein lies the real source of the bile directed at him by Western governments and their attendant elites, especially in the U.S. and Britain.

Gideon Levy en Haaretz, Not the good guys vs. the bad guys, propone una analogía con Israel y su intervención en el Líbano:

Encouraged by Western sympathy for their president, the Georgians thought they could do anything and that Russia would remain indifferent. But then came the surprise: Russia responded with force.

This is also how Israel responded to another provocation - the killing and abduction of Israeli soldiers by Hezbollah. This is how countries, including freer and more democratic ones than Russia, respond to provocations.

Evan Leland sobre el doble rasero:

Russia had given ample warnings to Saakashvili that if he attempted to grab such lands, he would meet resistance. In addition, the initial Georgian invasion killed Russian soldiers and apparently many civilians. The United States would never tolerate the killing of its military personnel in such a manner.

Según Alan Bock la intervención rusa era predecible:

It's not necessarily necessary, but Russia has always wanted only neighbors who are friendly or vassals on its border, and the prospect of a state longing to be in NATO, with Saakashvili talking constantly about eventually "retaking" the two provinces that have been de facto independent and allied to Russia (which made all residents Russian citizens) was predictably too much for Russians eager to flex their geopolitical muscles to bear. However it started, the Russians were better prepared (having probably war-gamed it a hundred ways).

Luis Gómez: tres hipótesis sobre la guerra en Georgia

Luis Gómez plantea tres hipótesis sobre la causa del conflicto armado en Georgia, del que hablo en esta entrada. Su conclusión:

Yo, particularmente, creo que una mezcla de las dos últimas tesis nos acerca a la verdad. El provincianismo de Mikheil Saakashvili y su servilismo a los intereses norteamericanos jugó en las manos de un Putin presionado por quienes desde las altas esferas rusas exigen un papel más relevante del país en su “zona de influencia”.

Si tuviera que apostar, creo que yo también lo haría por esta combinación.

Actualización: Otra columna de Justin Raimondo sobre Rusia y Georgia, esta vez respondiendo al artículo de Kristol en el NYT que menciona Luis en su entrada. Con las gafas pro-rusas puestas.

Aside from memorializing Stalin's policy of imprisoning ethnic minorities within larger administrative entities, refusing to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states allows the U.S. and the European community to maintain the fiction of Russian "expansionism." According to Washington, the Russians invaded "Georgia"; Saakashvili's invasion of South Ossetia doesn't qualify as aggression, since how can you invade your own country? South Ossetia and Abkhazia are part of Georgia, you see. Just like a small mammal is part of the anaconda that swallowed it whole. (...)

This dictatorial tradition is today carried on by President Mikheil Saakashvili, who unleashed police on demonstrators, injuring 500 people, during the hotly contested elections and shut down independent media with the same alacrity displayed by his Menshevik predecessors. It is little short of astonishing that Kristol holds up this smarmy regime of small-time hoodlums with big-time regional ambitions as some kind of model, the ideal U.S. ally whose fate we might even go to war over.

Actualización II: Charles King en Christian Science Monitor, siguiendo de cerca las hipótesis 2 y 3.

Russia must be condemned for its unsanctioned intervention. But the war began as an ill-considered move by Georgia to retake South Ossetia by force. Saakashvili's larger goal was to lead his country into war as a form of calculated self-sacrifice, hoping that Russia's predictable overreaction would convince the West of exactly the narrative that many commentators have now taken up.

Actualización III: Anthony Gregory, tremendo. Es lo mejor que he leído sobre el conflicto desde un punto de vista liberal. Gregory considera agresores a las dos partes: Georgia ha agredido Osetia del Sur, y Rusia ha agredido a Georgia con la excusa de estar defendiendo Osetia. Echando mano de abundates referencias, Gregory explica las raíces de la crisis, ahonda en la analogía con Serbia y Kosovo, y pone en tela de juicio las credenciales democráticas del actual gobierno georgiano.

Indeed, Russia should be criticized. Aside from driving the Georgians out of South Ossetia, it bombed Georgia, including civilian infrastructure, ports and roads. The main airfield outside of Tbilisi was reportedly hit. Georgia claims 90% of Georgian casualties in the conflict were civilian, although before it put the figure at 20%. Either way, for this there is no justification. (...)

Some people argue that South Ossetia has no claim to be independent, that it is naturally a part of Georgia. But for seven centuries, the Iranis have been settled in the Caucuses. While South Ossetia has an ethnic minority of Georgians, 20% of the population, two years ago the nation had a referendum. 99% voted for complete independence. It would seem that even if there are disagreements about pre-Soviet history in the region, this secession is fairly valid and the nation’s independent status for almost a generation should be respected.

Georgia should stay out of South Ossetia, Russia should stay out of Georgia, and the U.S. should stay out of it all.

(gracias Manuel)

El conflicto en Georgia y el sesgo anti-ruso

Opiniones tan contundentes y simplistas como las de Elentir sobre un conflicto complejo y con matices, que lleva gestándose desde principios de la década anterior, creo que dejan entrever un sesgo anti-ruso.

Georgia está siendo invadida por Rusia. Estamos ante una clara agresión rusa contra una nación independiente cuyo único “delito” es ser aliada de los Estados Unidos.

El comentario de Elentir es solo un ejemplo, titulares igual de categóricos se han multiplicado en los medios occidentales.

Conociendo las opiniones contrarians de Justin Raimondo en relación con Rusia y su política exterior, esperaba ansioso su columna de los lunes en Antiwar.com. Efectivamente su artículo "The Real Agressor" versa sobre el conflicto en el Cáucaso, y acusa a los medios occidentales de distorsionar los hechos y condenar a Rusia por una intervención análoga a la que llevó a cabo Estados Unidos en los Balcanes. Es posible que Raimondo esté a su vez afectado por un sesgo pro-ruso como reacción al sesgo anti-ruso de sus odiados neoconservadores y medios afines, pero aún así su opinión contribuye a compensar el simplismo en sentido opuesto. Recomiendo su lectura a todo el que esté interesado en las raíces y las implicaciones de este conflicto. Copio algunos fragmentos relevantes:

[T]he South Ossetians (and the Abkhazians) have had de facto independence since 1991, when they rose up against their "democratic" central government, which had banned regional parties from participating in elections. They beat back the Georgian army, which, nonetheless, inflicted a lot of casualties and damage. A low-level war has been in progress ever since, with Saakashvili and his ultra-nationalist party using the rebels as a foil to divert attention from their repressive domestic policies and Georgia's sad status as an economic basket case. (...)

Imagine if, say, Colombia invaded Panama, and rained bombs down on the many U.S. citizens currently living there. Would the U.S. act to ensure their safety? You betcha! So somebody please tell me why Russia hasn't the right to defend its own citizens, and even to deter and punish Georgian aggression.

Dicho esto, no conozco los entresijos del conflicto lo suficiente como para emitir un juicio firme o tomar partido. Es posible que después de todo los rusos sean los principales responsables de este conflicto o de su escalada, o que sus intenciones no sean benignas pese a tener su intervención cierto fundamento. Pero por lo que voy leyendo me inclino más por un titular del tipo "no hay buenos en la crisis del Cáucaso".

Actualización: James Poulos en The Guardian, en la misma línea que Raimondo.

National Review's Jonah Goldberg cries that "this is what happens" when the west takes its eye off the Russians to enjoy the Olympics. "This", of course, is the brutalisation of a hapless, innocent, fledgling democracy – a role played to the hilt by Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, who has spared no absurdity in his increasingly haggard efforts to trigger a western bailout of his hasty and ill-advised weekend invasion of long-autonomous South Ossetia.

Saakashvili's overheated rhetoric – "If the whole world does not stop Russia," he has remarked, "then Russian tanks will be able to reach any other European capital" – is illustrative of the kind of feverish thinking that is sure to transform a regional crisis into a global one.

Actualización II: la CNN informa sobre la incursión de las tropas rusas en territorio georgiano. El artículo también hace referencia al contexto político de Osetia del Sur y a las acusaciones de genocidio y agresión que se están cruzando rusos y georgianos.

El auge de China y la hegemonía americana

Doug Bandow escribe en Antiwar.com sobre el auge de China y lo que supone para la hegemonía americana y su política exterior.

The China that could be browbeaten by outsiders disappeared in 1949, with the proclamation of the PRC. The most powerful incentive for China to change its behavior today is the desire to play a larger international role. For instance, becoming a leading trading nation required membership in the World Trade Organization and a series of domestically controversial economic and legal reforms. The desire to influence Taiwanese politics required Beijing to drop its crude, overt threats against the island state a few years ago. (...)

Perceived hostility toward America reflects many roots. Genuine ideological Marxist-Leninists dedicated to the global destruction of capitalism still exist, but they hold few positions of influence. Far more important are the many Chinese, call them patriots or nationalists, depending on your perspective, who are determined to prevent the U.S. and other nations from coercing the PRC in the future. They certainly are not friendly to Washington's imperial pretensions. But they aren't likely to ignite a global nuclear holocaust, either. (...)

Thus, in the short term the U.S. has nothing to fear from China's rise, other than a reduction in Washington's ability to initiate war halfway around the world against the PRC for less than vital interests. In the longer term the U.S. will have to adapt to a world where it no longer dominates every region on every issue. But there is no reason for American-Chinese competition to turn violent.

Georgia ya ha perdido

O eso es lo que cree Joshua Trevino:

The real question for Georgia, then, is not whether it will win or lose – it has already lost – but how bad its loss will be. The worst case scenario is a Russian occupation and annexation. Fortunately for the Georgians, that’s also the least likely. Less unlikely is some sort of Russian occupation coupled with a Russian-driven regime change that puts Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili on the street – if he’s lucky. This might not be the tragedy for Georgia it seems, given Saakashvili’s rather astonishing incompetent gamble in leading the country into the present war. Most likely is that the Russians fully occupy South Ossetia, along with the other secessionist region of Georgia, Abkhazia; declare them both independent or somehow annexed; and thoroughly punish the Georgians with a countrywide air campaign targeting what meager infrastructure there is. Georgia at war’s end – which may well be mere days away – will be definitively dismembered, and smoldering in body and heart.

El gobierno de Singapur se plantea legalizar el comercio de órganos

El Straits Times informa que el gobierno de Singapur se plantea legalizar las compensaciones económicas por la donación de riñones para paliar la escasez que tiene en vilo a cientos de pacientes en lista de espera para un transplante.

SINGAPORE is considering legalising kidney trading to help meet demand for kidney transplants, the city-state's health minister said on Monday. The Health Ministry will examine the feasibility of providing payments to unrelated donors to augment the supply of kidneys.

Los pacientes a veces deben esperar hasta nueve años para recibir el riñón de alguien fallecido, y muchos mueren al no conseguir el órgano a tiempo.

[A]bout 1,000 new cases of kidney failure are diagnosed every year, with nearly 40 per cent unable to survive the first year.

El Ministro de Sanidad cree que los incentivos económicos pueden incrementar la oferta de riñones y deben ser contemplados como una posible medida aunque sea controvertida.

Mr Khaw said the ministry would review possible changes to current legislation to allow payments for donations from third parties such as those from the charity and religious sectors. Under the proposal, which would need to be approved by Parliament to become law, patients would also get help in finding donors.

'There are desperate patients out there wishing to live and desperately poor people willing to exchange a kidney for a hopefully improved life,' he said. 'Criminalising organ trading does not eliminate it ... it merely breeds a black market.'

Bryan Caplan llama a los burócratas de Singapur "la burocracia más letrada en economía" por su inclinación a promover políticas pro-mercado.

The Economist sobre las Olimpiadas chinas

Según el semanario británico The Economist, el auge de China es motivo de celebración a pesar de las Olimpiadas:

This is [el auge de China] indeed a cause for great celebration. But the Olympics have had little to do with it. On balance, the award of the games has done more harm than good to the opening up of China. The big forces driving that opening are independent of the games (see article). One is the speed with which China globalised in the 1980s and 1990s and then accelerated to a breakneck pace after accession to the World Trade Organisation in 2001. The other is the spread of the internet and mobile telephony that have transformed society. The Olympics, by contrast, have seen the Communist Party reassert an authoritarian grip over Beijing. It has used the pretext of an alleged terrorist threat to impose a restrictive security cordon on the city and curtail visas even for harmless businessmen.

Nota: parece que mi conexión vuelve a estar up and running, así que seguiré posteando a buen ritmo. Debates siguen abiertos aquí y aquí. No aptos para alérgicos a las parrafadas.

Taiwán y China estrechan sus relaciones comerciales

Una noticia positiva, después de años de tensiones con el Partido Democrático Progresista taiwanés pujando peligrosamente por una independencia oficial innecesaria, porque de facto ya existe. El Partido del Kuomintang, ahora en el poder, prefiere estrechar lazos comerciales con Pequín en vez de buscar la confrontación. Me parece un acercamiento más pragmático y fructífero. Tanto para Taiwán como para China.

June 16: Taiwan securities regulator announces plans to allow the island's brokerages to invest up to 30 percent of their net assets in China, up from 10 percent previously.

(...)

July 3: Taiwan says it will relax restrictions on mutual-fund investment in China-related stocks, allowing them to increase from 0.4 percent to 10 percent.

July 4: First 'weekend' flights touch down in Taipei. They are the first regular flights, aside from a few charters on select holidays, since 1949, when defeated Nationalist forces fled to Taiwan after the Chinese civil war.

(vía Antiwar.com)