Después del giro intervencionista de los Estados al estallar la crisis, con rescates y estímulos keynesianos, parece que algunos países están empezando a virar en la dirección contraria, recortando gasto y rebajando impuestos.
En el Reino Unido, George Osborne acaba de presentar el esperado presupuesto de emergencia para reducir el déficit fiscal. Aumenta el IVA (del 17,5% al 20%) y el impuesto sobre ganancias del capital (del 18% al 28% para las rentas superiores). Los bancos estarán sujetos a un nuevo impuesto. El resto son básicamente recortes de gastos e impuestos (con matices):
Incremento en £1.000 del mínimo exento del impuesto sobre la renta (que pasará a ser de £7.475), dejando a 880.000 personas de renta baja completamente exentas de este impuesto (pero esta medida queda ensombrecida por la reducción del nivel de ingresos del tramo del 40%, con lo que 700.000 personas saltarán a este tramo).
El impuesto de sociedades se reducirá un 1% cada año hasta llegar al 24% (del 28% actual). El impuesto de sociedades para las pequeñas empresas se reducirá del 21% al 20%. El tramo a partir del cual los empresarios empiezan a pagar cotizaciones a la Seguridad Social se elevará en £21 a la semana, y las empresas de fuera de Londres estarán exentas del pago de £5,000 en cotizaciones para sus 10 primeros empleados
Los presupuestos de cada departamento (a excepción de sanidad y ayuda externa) se reducirán en un 25% durante la legislatura. Recortes en prestaciones sociales por valor de 11.000 millones de libras. El gasto público en relación con el PIB pasará del 47,3% este año al 39,8% en 2015-2016 (véase este gráfico)
En otros países del entorno europeo también se están tomando medidas bien encaminadas:
Leon Hadar escribe en The Huffington Post sobre el "bluff" de las revoluciones coloridas respaldadas por Washington en las ex repúblicas soviéticas y Oriente Medio.
The narrative of the Tulip Revolution and its final chapter sounds familiar since it resembles the story-lines of the first two celebrated color revolutions of the decade. Indeed, like in Kyrgyzstan in 2005, Georgia's Rose Revolution in 2003 and Ukraine's Orange Revolution in 2004 seemed to follow a familiar script. A disputed election followed by protests by students, intellectuals and other cool guys and gals that lead to the overthrow of a reviled old-guard type and to a new election of a young and westernized figure. In Georgia, ex-communist boss Eduard Shevardnadze was replaced with the energetic modernizer Mikhail Saakashvili who had studied and worked as a lawyer in New York; in Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych, a corrupt apparatchik with close ties to Moscow was defeated by Viktor Yushchenko,a charismatic political figure advocating partnership with the U.S. and the European Union (EU) who was joined by sexy reformer and tycoon Yulia Tymoshenko, a cross between Margaret Thatcher and Snejana Onopka. (...)
[T]he U.S.-led campaign to promote democracy in the former Soviet Bloc after the collapse of communism, and American encouragement of the color revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia, Iraq and Lebanon, were based on the assumption that the drive by individuals and groups in these nations and societies to oust their ruling elites was motivated primarily by universal ideals of democracy and liberalism and by the appeal of joining the West. But this narrative seemed to disregard a critical element in these developments. These revolutions were impelled by powerful nationalist, ethnic, and religious forces, like the anti- Russian sentiments found in Georgia or among the Ukrainian majority in Ukraine; not surprisingly, members of the Russian minority in Ukraine opposed the Orange Revolution. Similarly, the Cedar Revolution in Lebanon pitted Maronite Christians and Sunni Muslims against Shiites backed by Iran, while the political changes in Iraq in the aftermath of Saddam's ouster empowered the Arab Shiites and the Kurds while weakening the former Sunni controlled elites. To make the story line even more complex, what many Americans see as a linear process of democratization and liberalization could be seen as the playing out of intra-elite rivalries over power and money.
Hence, "our" Good Guys -- Mikhail Saakashvili in Georgia, Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko in Ukraine, Kurmanbek Bakiyev in Kyrgyzstan, or for that matter, Ahmed Chalabi in Iraq - proved to be to be as power hungry and greedy as their predecessors, disregarding democratic principles and employing ultra-nationalism and chauvinism in order to cling to power, and exploiting American diplomatic and economic support as part of effort to contain domestic and outside threats and win financial assistance. And when being "pro-American" became less cost-effective, they hedged their bets by allying with, say, Russia or Iran. What was construed as an ideological love affair with American turns out to be a diplomatic one night stand.
Los neoconservadores se sublevan cuando algunos afirmamos que el intervencionismo militar americano pasado y presente (como el estacionamiento de tropas en Arabia Saudita o la actual ocupación de Afganistán e Irak) genera hostilidad en el mundo musulmán, facilita el reclutamiento de terroristas por parte de organizaciones como Al Qaeda, y puede contribuir a la comisión de atentados como el del 11-S.
Ron Paul provocó controversia al referirse al atentado contra las torres gemelas como un "blowback" (una reacción) a la política exterior americana. Paul exageró el argumento, pues el terrorismo islámico también tiene causas endógenas que son independientes de las políticas de Washington, pero sí es válido en cierta medida y no debería provocar ningún escándalo. Buscar el móvil de un asesinato no implica justificar o excusar el asesinato (sobre el argumento del "blowback" recomiendo este artículo de Doug Bandow: War Without Consequence? Absurd).
Lo curioso es que la alusión al "blowback" sea alegremente tolerada cuando el objeto de la crítica no es Estados Unidos sino Rusia. Rusia sí puede generar hostilidad y fomentar el terrorismo con sus políticas en Chechenia, pero Estados Unidos simplemente no puede.
En el blog de National Review, The Corner, Alex Alexiev defiende la tesis del "blowback" ruso:
The entire economic growth system, where one regional centre prints money without respite and consumes material wealth, while another regional centre manufactures inexpensive goods and saves money printed by other governments, has suffered a major setback. (...)
This means we must assess the real situation and write off all hopeless debts and "bad" assets.
True, this will be an extremely painful and unpleasant process. Far from everyone can accept such measures, fearing for their capitalisation, bonuses or reputation. However, we would "conserve" and prolong the crisis, unless we clean up our balance sheets. I believe financial authorities must work out the required mechanism for writing off debts that corresponds to today's needs.
También alerta sobre la tentación de agrandar el Estado en tiempos de crisis, aludiendo a la Unión Soviética como ejemplo de sistema intervencionista "totalmente anti-competitivo" y que "nadie quiere verlo repetido".
Un documental de investigación de la BBC pone en tela de juicio la versión georgiana del conflicto, a saber, que la incursión de su ejército fue una respuesta a la entrada de tropas rusas en Osetia, que supuestamente penetraron por el túnel de Gori antes de que los georgianos tomaran la región (Michael Totten aquí). La prueba parece ser una conversación telefónica medio fantasma (estuvo "perdida" durante semanas) entre oficiales rusos que delata la movilización del ejército con anterioridad al avance georgiano. Pero hay varios hechos que no encajan con esta versión, y múltiples testigos desmienten que los rusos llegaran la noche del día 7 como alega el Gobierno georgiano.
El documental acusa a los georgianos de atacar indiscriminadamente a civiles (Human Rights Watch cuenta entre 300 y 400 muertos civiles). Incluye opiniones de ambos bandos y también acusa a los rebeldes osetios de atacar civiles (y al ejército ruso de no contenerlos).
Las críticas contra Saakashvili están arreciando ahora que se han levantado las restricciones a la libertad de expresión en Georgia (vigentes durante la contienda). El Washington Postinforma que varias voces reclaman investigaciones sobre los errores diplomáticos y tácticos cometidos por el Gobierno, y algunos analistas predicen que Saakashvili será presionado para que renuncie.
David Usupashvili, leader of the opposition Republican Party, said he had serious concerns about the decision to fight the much larger Russian army. "I don't believe that the Georgian government started this military action, but I condemn my government's action to respond with a full-scale military conflict" (...)
David Gamkrelidze, leader of the opposition New Rights party, said that "[b]y his military rhetoric, and all kinds of provocations, Saakashvili tried to show that he can return these territories by the military way, that he has this capacity, he has this force." (...)
Officials present at some of the prewar discussions said that Saakashvili and a tight group of supporters seemed convinced they had the military power to win back South Ossetia -- which Georgian forces attacked on the night of Aug. 7 -- within a few hours or days and were not interested in opposing points of view.
Doug Bandow, en su artículo "Georgian Fantasies: Where are the Americans?", ahonda en la tesis de que la política exterior norteamericana ha contribuido al estallido de la crisis del Cáucaso, que mencioné en esta entrada.
U.S. behavior provided an almost perfect example of a mixed message. The Bush administration counseled caution, yes, but also meddled in Georgian affairs to promote Saakashvili's rise to power through the Rose Revolution, helped arm and train his military, provided abundant economic and military aid, championed his nation's candidacy for NATO, lavished praise on him for being a wonderful democrat and friend of America, and sent President Bush to Tbilisi. Says Charles Kupchan of the Council on Foreign Relations, "Through private channels [the U.S.] was saying: ‘You have to behave' but publicly it was portraying him as a knight in shining armor, a beacon of freedom." The result, notes Jon Sawyer of the Pulitzer Center for Crisis Reporting, was "that Mikheil Saakashvili approached this thinking that he could be an extension of the West, a partner of the United States." In July Secretary Rice visited Tbilisi and declared, with Saakashvili next to her: "Mr. President, we always fight for our friends." During the war Vice President Richard Cheney told Saakashvili that "Russian aggression must not go unanswered."
None of these actions or statements formally committed the U.S. to go to war, but they could easily have been interpreted that way by an authoritarian populist used to getting his own way and a man desperate to fulfill his campaign promise to reconquer lost territory. Certainly he wanted to believe Washington's expansive professions of comradeship. Observes Kupchan, U.S. policy made Saakashvili "overreach, it made him feel at the end of the day that the West would come to his assistance if he got into trouble."
La ONG Human Rights Watch denuncia la quema y saqueo de pueblos étnicamente georgianos en Osetia del Sur por parte de milicias separatistas.
Recent satellite images released by the UN program UNOSAT confirm the widespread torching of ethnic Georgian villages inside South Ossetia, Human Rights Watch said today. Detailed analysis of the damage depicted in five ethnic Georgian villages shows the destruction of these villages around the South Ossetian capital, Tskhinvali, was caused by intentional burning and not armed combat.
“Human Rights Watch researchers personally witnessed Ossetian militias looting and burning down ethnic Georgian villages during their research in the area,” said Rachel Denber, deputy director of the Europe and Central Asia division of Human Rights Watch.
El contrapunto a la tesis de que Georgia inició el enfrentamiento invadiendo Osetia del Sur lo pone Michael Totten con su reportaje sobre el terreno "The Truth About Russia in Georgia" (vía Barcepundit). Según el relato de Totten, los separatistas osetios violaron el alto el fuego atacando pueblos étnicamente georgianos y una columna rusa estaba penetraron en Osetia del Sur antes de que el ejército georgiano empezara a movilizarse.
On the 6th, (...) The shelling intensifies during the night and there is, again, tit for tat, but this time with weapons coming from the South Ossetian side which are not allowed under the agreement. By that time, the Georgians were seriously worried. All their armor that was near Abkhazia starts moving, but they are tanks, they don't have tank transporters, so they move slowly. They don't make it back in time. On the 7th, this continues. That afternoon, the president announces a unilateral ceasefire, a different one from the previous ones. It means I stop firing first, and if you fire, I still won't fire back. That holds until the next part of the story.
