Recomiendo leer entero un reportaje de The Economist sobre la situación en Irak a propósito de las recientes elecciones: No promised land at the end of all this. Es algo extenso pero vale la pena. No contentará ni a quienes tienen una visión optimista de los acontecimientos ni a los que la tienen muy pesimista. Irak parece estar al borde del precipicio o alejándose de él, dependiendo de los indicadores que observemos o las dinámicas que nos parezcan más relevantes.
Santiago Navajas, hablando de la (merecidamente) oscarizada The Hurt Locker (En tierra hostil), se refiere a las "evidencias de democracia consolidada". Aunque el artículo del semanario británico es matizado, no da para tan alentadora conclusión. Copio algunos fragmentos.
En el ámbito económico:
Few middle-sized businesses have emerged since the invasion. Companies are either small family affairs or sclerotic behemoths. The non-oil industries, still partly state-owned, should soak up labour. But they account for only 13% of GDP (the regional average is 33%). Mass idleness is the result. American soldiers stationed in rural areas with few government jobs say the unemployment rate there approaches 80%. The national rate is 45-47%, including the underemployed—and, because of the high birth rate, the workforce is growing by 240,000 a year.
The one bright spot is foreign investment, mostly in oil. In the past three months Iraq has signed ten deals with large international companies: these may eventually double or triple Iraq’s oil revenues, the main source of state funding. Construction and service companies are also coming, mostly from neighbouring countries and Asia. But Western non-oil companies tend to stay away. Last year at the first trade fair since the invasion only three of the 396 companies were American. Security is one reason. Protecting staff and installations is estimated to increase costs by something like 25%. Even more important, executives fear “an unco-ordinated, opaque regulatory system, unclear or uncertain land titling, untested dispute-resolution mechanisms and endemic corruption,” said a recent American congressional report. Iraq ranks 153rd in the world for ease of doing business.
En el ámbito político:
There is a real risk that Iraq’s democratic institutions will not survive. They are too weak and too corrupted to resolve the country’s many problems peacefully and credibly. Ambitious politicians are able to go outside the institutional framework to further their partisan aims. In their turn, people are losing faith in democracy, which seemingly does not bring results. (...)
A return to fully fledged sectarian warfare is not yet likely, given the heavy security presence. But there are plenty of other ways in which Iraq could slide. If left unresolved, the Arab-Kurdish conflict could pit two well-armed forces against each other. There has even been talk of a coup. The conditions are ripe: a venal elite, increasingly capable armed forces and a disaffected population wishing for stability, if need be under the sort of strongman Iraq knows only too well.
But more likely than a coup is an authoritarian takeover by politicians and generals acting together. Like many of his rivals, Mr Maliki appears capable of such a move. He has centralised control of the security services, imposed a curfew, condoned police torture, attempted to muzzle the media and deployed armed forces to influence party-political disputes. At best, Iraq can expect a continuation of the current state of affairs. Shias will further consolidate their power and occupy an archipelago of fiefs, frequently short-changing the public. Uneasy brinkmanship will be the norm. A senior government adviser puts it this way: “You should expect crisis in Iraq. This will not be a normal country, but it will not collapse either, God willing.”
