Arnold Kling sobre el derecho de salida en un contexto de gobiernos competitivos:
[S]uppose that I live on a street where we all share the same snow removal service. When I see what we are going to be charged for a big storm, I opt out, so that I do not have to pay for snow removal. The street in front of my house goes unplowed, so that everyone else on the street is either blocked or has to pay more to get my part of the street plowed. Is that a good system?
I do not think that this is an insoluble problem. In the private sector, there are situations where one consumer's exit can raise average costs. The solution is some form of lock-in. For example, condominium associations lock consumers into paying dues. Cell phone companies lock you into paying for a year or more of service.
We allow private firms to implement lock-in policies, as long as they are reasonable. Similarly, I think we should allow physical or virtual communities that perform what we now think of as government functions to implement lock-in policies as long as they are reasonable. I think we would need courts and an accumulation of common law precedents to serve as the ultimate arbiter of when lock-in policies are reasonable and when they infringe on the right of exit.
(HT: Capella)
