Se lee rápido, pero no lo recomiendo. No porque sea básico, sino porque siendo básico no explica realmente lo básico y es bastante repetitivo. Ron Paul engarza la reserva federal con una variedad de temas, dentro de un discurso anti-estatista más general, como siempre hace en sus declaraciones. En tanto panfleto político no está mal, y probablemente influya a gente recién llegada al movimiento gracias a la repercusión mediática de Paul este último año. Pero End the Fed no es la obra indicada si uno quiere comprender cómo interviene la Reserva Federal en el mercado monetario, o cómo se ha generado la crisis (para esto sí hay un libro muy recomendable que he leído hace poco: Meltdown: A Free-Market Look at Why the Stock Market Collapsed, the Economy Tanked, and Government Bailouts Will Make Things Worse
, de Tom Woods).
La parte más interesante del libro es la selección de intercambios con Alan Greenspan y Ben Bernanke. ¿Qué otro político puede llegar a discutir como economista y rebatir a un gobernador de un Banco Central? También se leen con atención los capítulos en los que habla de experiencias personales, por ejemplo su actividad en la Gold Comission o sus influencias intelectuales.
Extracto algunos párrafos que aluden a anécdotas curiosas.
Paul Volcker, presidente de la Reserva Federal en los 80 (págs. 48-50):
Being in Congress in the late 1970s and early 1980s and serving on the House Banking Committee, I met and got to question several Federal Reserve Board chairmen: Arthur Burns, William G. Miller, and Paul Volcker.
Of the three, I Had the most interaction with Volcker. He was more personable and smarter that the others, including the more recent board chairmen Alan Greenspan and Ben Bernanke. (...)
I expressed my concern to Chairman Volcker at a hearing that reserve requirements could be lowered to zero and the Federal Reserve could buy any asset, including foreign debt.
Volcker invited me to a private breakfast to dissuade me from my interpretation. Lew Rockwell, my chief of staff, went with me to the breakfast. (...) The breakfast went well, and he was quite cordial. This is not something Greenspan ever invited me to do; nor do I expect an invitation anytime soon to a private breakfast and discussion with Bernanke. At the end of the breakfast, Volcker finally agreed that my interpretation of the language was correct, but assured me he would never lower reserve requirements to that degree or buy up worthless assets. His argument was that the Fed wanted this authority to have free rein in raising reserve requirements at will, as he indeed did with interest rates that broke the back of the raging inflation of the 1970s. As we were leaving, I said that, although I didn´t expect that he would use these extreme powers, who knew if in the future we might just have someone who would. The future is now here.
Ronald Reagan simpatizando con el patrón oro (pág. 73-74):
Alan Greenspan y su antigua defensa del patrón oro (pág. 80, 86):The Houston Republican delegation made plans to attend a Republican function in Houston, along with President Reagan. We ere to meet Reagan at Andrews Air Force Base and fly on Air Force One to Houston. Due to the commission's hearing at the Treasury Building, which is acrss the street from the White House, my staff arranged for me to walk across the street and fly with Presiden Reagan on Marine One to Andrews. That way I wouldn´t miss any part of the hearing and could still travel to Houston for the Republican meeting.
On the helicopter flight to Andews, the subject of the gold standard naturally came up. "Ron", the President told me, "no great nation that abandoned the gold standard has remained a great nation." He indeed was sympathetic, as he was to many libertarian constitucional ideas, but he was also swayed by staff pressure to be pragmatic on most issues.
Arthur Costamanga, a friend of Reagan's and a member of the commission signed on our dissenting views with a minor qualification. Lew Lehrman, later to run for governor of New York, signed as well. Then my staff and I scheduled a meeting and get a photo opportunity. The meeting was scheduled without a specific purpose, and I didn't want to surprise him with my plan. We called back to clarify the intent of the meeting. It wasn´t too long after taht that we received a callback from the White House staff saying that the meeting was canceled. The presentation and picture taking never occurred.
I'm sure Jim Baker, and specially Don Regan, made sure that it did not take place. Don Regan, as chairman of the Gold Commission, was the one who demanded the whole series of hearings be kept secret without minutes.
[Greenspan] fascinated me the most because of my early exposure to his support for the gold standard and disdain for the Federal Reserve and paper money.
I was a subscriber to Ayn Rand's objectivist newspaper of the 1960s and studied closely Greenspan's 1966 article "Gold and Economic Freedom" in that publication. I told him that he had made a favorable impression on me - once. He always was aware of exactly where I was coming from, and at times, even when I did not explicitly mention gold in my questions, he would answer in the context of the gold standard. Although frequently annoyed, and more so as the years went on, he never seemed quite as annoyed or dismayed as Ben Bernanke is with my questions.
Prior to one of our biannual meetings with Greenspan, we were given a photo opportunity. Since it was a scheduled event, I brought with me my copy of the original faded green objectivist newspaper of 1966. During the short visit and picture taking, I showed him a copy of the letter and asked if he recalled the newsletter, which he quickly acknowledged.
Upon opening the small booklet to his "Gold and Economic Freedom" article, I asked if he would autograph the article for me, which he promptly did. As he was signing the article, I asked if he would like to put a disclaimer on it. Astoundingly, he answered that he had just recenlty reread it and wouldn't change a word of it.





