Singapur, uno de los países más prósperos y con mayor grado de libertad económica del mundo, es popularmente considerado una dictadura o autocracia. Tras visitar el país y estudiar su sistema político Bryan Caplan disputó esta acusación señalando que hay una variedad de partidos legales en la oposición que compiten con el partido dominante (People's Action Party) en elecciones libres, regulares y no corruptas (según Transparencia Internacional, Singapur es el cuarto país menos corrupto del mundo, y consigue excelentes resultados en los indicadores de Governance Matters del Banco Mundial). La democracia singapurense tiene ciertas peculiaridades, pero es una democracia al fin y al cabo. Lo que sucede es que siempre gana el mismo partido por mayoría abrumadora (82 de 84 escaños en el parlamento). ¿Es un resultado sospechoso?
No lo es, dice Caplan, si pensamos en Singapur como "ciudad-estado" y no como "Estado". Singapur es una ciudad, y hay numerosos ejemplos de ciudades o regiones que no han cambiado de partido gobernante en décadas. Caplan menciona San Francisco, en España podríamos citar Barcelona o Andalucía. ¿Es la alternancia en el gobierno un requisito democrático? ¿Acaso no son democráticas las instituciones de estas ciudades y regiones?
Para sorpresa de Caplan, el ministro de justicia singapurense K. Shanmugam ha citado sus argumentos (y a él mismo) para defender las credenciales democráticas de Singapur en una conferencia internacional en Nueva York.
Copio parte de la noticia:
IN CHICAGO, Democratic mayors have won without interruption since 1931. In San Francisco, they have done so since 1964.
And while Democrats have not monopolised the mayor's office in New York City, they have near-PAP dominance of the city council, where they hold 45 out of 48 occupied seats.
'But nobody questions whether there is a democracy in New York,' Law Minister K. Shanmugam said on Wednesday, referring to the frequent questioning of Singapore's democratic credentials given the 50-year dominance of the ruling People's Action Party.
Drawing on arguments by American economist Bryan Caplan in a recent article, he said Singapore was viewed as a deviation from the democratic norm because it was seen primarily as a country.
'This is where most people make a mistake...I have tried to explain that we are different. We are a city. We are not a country,' he told 200 lawyers, many from America, at the New York State Bar Association International Section's meeting here.
Mr M. N. Krishnamani, a panellist and president of the Supreme Court of India Bar Association, asked if it was true that with the ruling PAP in power for some decades now, the opposition was unable to survive or win cases in the courts.
Mr Shanmugam anticipated such a question and came prepared with Dr Caplan's article, published in July. Reading extracts, he told his audience it was the best response he could provide to the question...
Caplan aprovecha esta inesperada atención de los políticos de Singapur para enumerar en su blog varias políticas anti-liberales que el Gobierno de Singapur debería revisar: el servicio militar obligatorio, la pena de muerte para comerciantes de droga, la propiedad pública de determinadas empresas y medios de comunicación, las fuertes leyes anti-difamación y la censura.
Vale la pena leer también las opiniones de varios nativos de Singapur y otros asiáticos que conocen la ciudad-estado de cerca en los comentarios. Algunos de ellos sostienen que el régimen no reprime de forma directa a los disidentes, pero sí emplea medios indirectos para presionarlos en favor de la conformidad, y el sistema electoral otorga una bajísima representación a los partidos minoritarios. En cualquier caso el PAP tiene un apoyo amplio y la gente en Singapur valora la seguridad, la prosperidad y la estabilidad política que el PAP parece ofrecerles.
El Online Citizen de Singapur ha publicado el ensayo de Caplan sobre el sistema político del país: Two Paradoxes of Singaporean Political Economy. Caplan da cuenta de las reacciones mixtas por parte de los lectores. Copio debajo la conclusión de su artículo, me parece sumamente interesante.
El caso de Singapur ilustra la importancia de la descentralización y secesión de unidades políticas pequeñas. Habría más experimentación institucional y más ejempos en los extremos del continuum de una economía mixta: algunas ciudades-estado o regiones virarían hacía el intervencionismo, pero otras (liberadas del lastre de electores de tendencia socialista del territorio del que se escinden) virarían hacia el modelo hongkonés o singapurense. La polarización y el contraste entre modelos sería más evidente, y el voto con los pies (de trabajadores, empresas y capital) haría el resto...In the West, Singapore is widely perceived as a benevolent dictatorship. From this starting point, social scientists have little to learn from Singaporean political economy: The explanation for Singapore’s success is simply that it had the good fortune to be ruled by the smartest, nicest dictators on earth.
Once one corrects Western misconceptions about Singapore’s democratic credentials, though, the city-state looks curiouser and curiouser. Singapore seems to contradict everything that economists and political scientists think they know about democracy: How can any party honestly win election after election – much less a party committed to many economically efficient but unpopular policies?
Given the scarcity of data, I can only begin to answer this question. Still, there is little reason to believe that Singaporean voters are markedly more economically literate than voters in other countries. The secret to Singapore’s success seems to lie in its electorate’s “party preference” for a ruling party that happens to take economic reasoning seriously. Party preferences in favor of the PAP give it enough slack to impose policies that would not survive a direct popular vote. There is convincing evidence in favor of both the deference and resignation interpretations of Singaporeans’ party preferences, but the topic deserves further study.
Understanding the paradoxes of Singaporean political economy sheds new light on political economy in general. While most democracies have frequent partisan turnover at the national level, sub-national democratic politics are often as one-sided as in Singapore. In the broader world, though, one-party democracy does not seem to depend on the delivery of remarkable economic performance. Is this because the relative importance of loyalty, deference, and resignation varies? Or did Singapore simply have the good fortune to put blind trust in men who coincidentally deserved it?
Once political economists have a better handle on one-party democracy, they will be ready to take a second look at national politics. Why exactly is it so hard for one party in a democracy to stay on top at the national level? One interesting hypothesis is simply that people are more interested in – and therefore less resigned about – national politics. But this raises further questions: What determines whether a given democratic contest will catch voters’ interest? And under what circumstances does greater interest lead to worse policies?
It is easy to find fascination in Singapore. Observers around the world have been intrigued by its economy, history, policies, culture, cuisine, and architecture. My research on Singapore has convinced me that its political economy deserves to be added to the list of “the most fascinating things about Singapore.” It is an illuminating challenge to time-tested models of how democracy works. But more importantly, the mechanisms underlying Singaporean political economy are probably at work in every democracy. These mechanisms are not unique to Singapore, just uniquely visible.
