John Laughland escribe un artículo interesante en The Brussels Journal sobre la conveniencia o no de dotar al Tribunal Internacional de La Haya de jurisdicción sobre crímenes cometidos por gobiernos de países que no se han suscrito al tribunal. Se espera que los jueces del tribunal validen la acusación del fiscal contra el Presidente de Sudan por genocidio, y cuando ello suceda la soberanía nacional de los Estados estará definitivamente supeditada a la "justicia internacional". ¿Sería este acontecimiento una buena noticia?
Como explica Laughland, los activistas en pro de los derechos humanos hace años que claman por esta internacionalización de la justicia. Está claro que los Estados no tienen ningún derecho a abusar de sus propios ciudadanos, y argüir que un tribunal foráneo no tiene legitimidad para intervenir equivale a decir que un tribunal nacional no puede sentenciar a un padre que abusa de su hijo en casa. Pero, prosigue Laughland, una cosa es sostener que el Estado de Sudán no tiene derecho a abusar de su población, y otra distinta afirmar que la mejor manera de lograr la paz en Darfur es através de la condena de un jefe de Estado en el Tribunal de la Haya. Lo segundo no es un juicio ético sino un juicio político.
Laughland opina conceder al Tribunal Internacional jurisdicción sobre países que no firmantes no es una buena idea. Los conflictos nacionales es mejor tratarlos dentro de su propio contexto, por aquellos que han sido afectados y aquellos que tendrán que apechugar con las consecuencias.
“When is it right to use force?” We normally take it for granted that force is justified to prevent crimes. But to what extent is the criminal law an appropriate conceptual instrument for analysing war? There may, I suppose, be some cases in which it is excusable for a policeman not to act when he sees a crime being committed, but they are marginal exceptions. By contrast, it is very easy to envisage cases in which the cessation of hostilities is preferable to continuing violence in the name of justice. Indeed, peace treaties are often signed between former enemies which precisely contain clauses drawing a line under any future prosecutions.
In the Bosnian civil war (1992-1995) the numerous attempts to broke a peace agreement were attacked by human rights activists in the name of justice. Politicians who accepted their arguments scuppered these agreements saying that aggression should not be rewarded. Eventually, when everyone was exhausted, a peace agreement was signed along the very lines proposed and rejected at the beginning of the conflict. In other words, the war was prolonged needlessly for three years and tens of thousands of people were killed for nothing. “Justice”, in other words, can be a very poor guide in wartime.
It is obvious, then, that I am deeply sceptical about the veracity of the charges against Sudan and about the political usefulness of making them. But what about the first question? My view is that nation-states are a far better forum for adjudicating political questions than international organisations for one simple reason: national governments, even dictatorships, are part of the nation they govern, whereas international organisations are structurally disconnected from the people over whom they wield power. The judges at the ICC will never have to justify or give any account of their decisions to the Sudanese people whereas there is always the possibility that a tyrannical national regime can be overthrown or that it will reform itself.
