Mencius Moldbug escribe uno de los mejores, más didácticos y heterodoxos artículos que he leído sobre las causas de la crisis y sus posibles (o imposibles) soluciones: Maturity transformation considered harmful: an unauthorized biography of the bank crisis. Con su chispa habitual Mencius analiza la realidad económica siguiendo a la Escuela Austriaca para luego ofrecernos su particular receta, que digamos que difiere un poco de la de Ron Paul:
Paulson's bailout is, if anything, far too weak. Our financial system is part of the government. The proper first step is to stop lying about this. This means nationalizing the banks. This is not an expansion of government, but a recognition of its actual size. It is not an expenditure, but a revision of accounting to reflect reality.
A free-market financial system would be way cool. More important, it would be extremely stable. But the only way to create one is to build it right from the start. If you have a car and you want a motorcycle, sell your car and buy a motorcycle. Don't decide to call your car a "four-wheeled motorcycle," and don't think unscrewing two of the wheels will solve the problem.
Therefore, the government should close down the financial system we have now and replace it with one that doesn't suck. What is the probability that this will happen? Zero. But at least you know.
Según Mencius se trata de reconocer una realidad de facto:
[T]he banking system is part of USG because USG has already chosen to accept its liabilities - by guaranteeing them. When A guarantees B's liabilities, B needs to be on A's balance sheet. This is accounting 101, folks.
Mencius describe así la alternativa pura de mercado:
In the free-market solution, Washington renounces all bailouts, guarantees, nationalizations, etc. There is an easy way to do this: break the Fed's printing press. Pass a constitutional amendment limiting the number of dollars extant to the number of actual dollars in the world: M0, 825 billion. That's about $2750 for every American - although not all of these dollars, of course, are in America.
Result: the mother of all bank runs. All bank deposits are vaporized. The assets backing them become nearly worthless. Have fun paying off that $300,000 mortgage, with your $2750. Even Treasury obligations trade at pennies on the dollar - have fun paying off that $10T national debt, in a world with only 825 billion dollars.
The good news: hyperdeflation. If you have a dollar, an actual physical greenback, you can eat for a day. If you have $20, you're set for the month. A benjamin is unimaginable wealth. Gas? Five cents a gallon. Gold? Worthless. Ammo? Priceless. Basically, we're looking at Mad Max Beyond Thunderdome, with 1915 prices. I'm sure this would make some people very happy. I am not one of them.
Y este es uno de sus pasajes más brillantes:
Consider FooBank, with its FDIC guarantee in place. The infinite printing press guarantees FooBank's liabilities to its depositors. This leaves FooBank free to use the depositors' money to buy 30-year mortgages, while assuring them that they can redeem at any time.
A much simpler approach is for FooBank to simply store the deposits in its vaults, and have FDIC make the mortgage loans - in a quantity equalling FooBank's deposits. This produces: exactly the same safety for FooBank's depositors; exactly the same demand for mortgages; and exactly the same risks for FDIC (which is, of course, exposed to the mortgage risk).
And it's also utterly ridiculous. Basically, it means that mortgages are cheap because Uncle Sam is printing money and lending it. When you want a mortgage, you apply to the government. Moreover, the connection to FooBank's deposits is utterly unnecessary. There is no reason that FDIC has to restrict its mortgage issuance to FooBank's deposit base, tying it to the irrelevant convenience question of whether depositors prefer their money in a vault or under the mattress.
What this thought-experiment tells you is that, if you believe in maturity transformation, you believe it's good public policy for the government to print money and lend it.
En fin, el artículo es largo (¡no lo he citado entero!) pero vale la pena. Me gustaría que Rallo nos lo comentara. La receta de Rallo no pasaba por nacionalizar el sistema financiero, pero sí defendía reconocer formalmente una realidad de facto: la "maturity transformation" a la que se refiere Mencius, el hecho de que la deuda a corto plazo está respaldada (!) por inversiones a largo plazo.
